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· Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. In a separate 
article, I consider Supreme Court selection as war, while in this article I focus on the 
selection of lower court judges as war. I completed this article six months before the mid-
term elections of 2002. Together, I trust these articles will serve as a useful overview of the 
general phenomenon of judicial selection as war. In these and other works, I have 
benefited enormously from the empirical studies of judicial selection done by other 
scholars, including three participants in this Symposium - Sheldon Goldman, Elliot 
Slotnick, and Carl Tobias. I am especially grateful to John Oakley and Carl Tobias for the 
opportunity to participate in this Symposium. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A popular metaphor for describing judicial selection is war. One need 
look no further for confirmation of the continuing pull of this metaphor 
than newspaper reports on the implications of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's recent rejection of Charles Pickering's nomination by 
President George W. Bush to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit.1 In one report, veteran reporter Neil Lewis of The New York 
Times employs the term "battle" six times, including in the headline, to 
describe the nature of the likely conflicts arising over judicial 
nominations in anticipation of the next Supreme Court vacancy.2 
The Senate Judiciary Committee's rejection of the Pickering 
nomination- and its implications- seem to confirm the threat made at 
the outset of George W. Bush's presidency by some prominent 
Democrats. They warned that there would be a "war" if, after the 
Supreme Court's controversial opinion in Bush v. Gar/ short-circuiting 
Vice-President Gore's challenge to the vote count in Florida, Bush tried 
to claim a mandate to nominate conservative ideologues outside of the 
mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence.4 After September 11, 2001, 
some Republican senators and administration officials suggested, 
however, that the war against terrorism obliges senators to give special 
deference to the President's judicial nominees. Such deference would 
ensure a fully staffed judiciary available to properly monitor and process 
criminal proceedings coming out of the war against terrorism.5 
' See Executive Business Meeting Summary, Senate Judiciary Comm., Mar. 14, 2002, 
available at http:/ /www.senate.gov /%7Ejudiciary /summary /ex031402.pdf (providing the 
votes not to report Charles Pickering's nomination favorably, unfavorably, and without 
recommendation). 
' Neil A. Lewis, From Quiet Nomination to Noisy Test for Future Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
26, 2002, at A21. 
3 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
4 See BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGffiMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); Jack M. 
Balkin, Bush's Negative Mandate Narrows His Nominees, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, available at 
http: I I www.yale.edu /lawweb/jbalkin/opeds/negativemandateopedl.htm (suggesting 
that Bush's belief that he had such a mandate was illustrated by his nomination of Linda 
Chavez as Labor Secretary in January 2001). 
' See Hearing on Military Tribunals Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101" Cong. (2001), 
reprinted in FDCH Political Transcripts (Dec. 4, 2001), (statement by Sen. Orrin Hatch) 
(stating that "[the Senate Judiciary Committee] would better serve the public by looking for 
ways to help, instead of distracting the administration which has the enormous task on its 
hands and is doing a super job under very difficult circumstances ... one obvious way we 
could help is to confirm the nominees languishing in this committee for important jobs 
including judgeships"); Ari Fleischer, White House Press Briefing, available at 
http: I /www.whitehouse.gov I news/releases/2001 I 12/print/20011221-7.html (stating that 
"the president deserves to have his team in place, particularly during a time of war ... and 
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Moreover, it would ensure that conflicts over the nominees would not 
divert precious time and political capital the President needs to 
successfully wage the war. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with this argument is that the 
structure of the Constitution is plainly designed to invite conflict.6 
Anyone familiar with the process of judicial selection knows just how 
combative and vitriolic contests over judicial appointments can be. 
Though not always short, their nastiness and brutality seem otherwise to 
exemplify the infamous conditions Thomas Hobbes described as existing 
within the state of nature.7 The structure of the Constitution pits 
presidents and senators against each other in the appointments process. 
The framers fully expected, and even hoped, that conflicts would ensue 
from this design.8 Their expectation was that the constitutional checks 
and balances, including the distribution of authority on judicial 
appointments, were designed so that "ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition."9 The framers viewed conflicts as inevitable and 
even desirable. The ensuing friction would act to prevent one branch 
from aggrandizing power at the expense of others. It also would prevent 
one authority from becoming tyrannical. 
Yet, the structure of the Constitution invites not only conflicts but also 
accommodations. In relatively short order, presidents and senators 
developed informal accommodations or arrangements to reduce the 
inevitability of conflict and yet preserve some realm of discretion with 
respect to judicial appointments. These accommodations, expectations, 
or arrangements are institutional norms. 1° Following institutional norms 
generally produces peaceful co-existence between presidents and 
senators rather than sanctions. 
My thesis is relatively simple. Hostilities break out in the process for 
selecting lower court judges under two circumstances. The first is when 
the President, senators, and/or nominees violate some long-standing 
the American people deserve to have their government fully staffed and they deserve a 
court system that can fully carry out justice"). 
6 See also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000) (describing, inter alia, the dynamics 
resulting from the allocation of authority set forth in the Appointments Clause). 
7 Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN 84 O.C.A. Gaskin, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996). 
' See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 17-29 (describing 
framers' expectations regarding appointments). 
• THE FEDERALIST No. 51 349 Garnes Madison) Oacob E. Cooke ed., 1982). 
10 See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal 
Appointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687 n.3 (2001) (defining institutional norms)[hereinafter 
Gerhardt, Norm Theory]. 
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practices or expectations (some but not all of which constitute 
institutional norms). Alternatively, hostilities break out when the 
applicable institutional norms are in flux. I suggest this basic dynamic 
persists regardless of whether the nation is at war.11 History generally 
suggests that judicial appointments entail a give-and-take in which 
presidents and senators negotiate over their respective achievements of 
various short and long-term objectives. How well presidents and 
senators achieve their respective objectives and discharge their all-
important duties relating to judicial selection depends on their 
compliance with and coordination of the governing norms and 
expectations at the time appointments must be made. Presidents and 
senators obviously do not perform in a vacuum; context is all important, 
but context does not guarantee particular outcomes. The fact that the 
nation is at war is, of course, an important part of the context of present 
times, but it is not, and likely will not, make a difference to the process of 
judicial selection. A judicial appointment offers presidents, and at least 
some senators, an opportunity to negotiate over their respective 
objectives. How presidents and senators will view their opportunity, 
however, will depend on their respective calculations of their short and 
long-term needs. These calculations depend a great deal on the context 
in which they are made, including the perennial needs for both 
presidents and senators to reward friends, penalize foes, influence the 
direction of the lower courts, or to effectuate trading or deals to facilitate 
other legislative priorities and objectives. 
My purpose is not to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate some 
significant patterns in federal judicial selection. In Part I, I will briefly 
clarify some basic terminology, discuss the relevance of statistics, and 
identify some basic institutional norms in federal judicial selection. 
These norms include, among others: senatorial courtesy; good faith 
consultation with the Senate; nominees' fitting the basic ethical and 
professional expectations of the times; making timely nominations; 
substantial senatorial discretion in pacing the confirmation process; 
following (or at least not altering) basic vetting procedures; and 
responsible rhetoric in framing the terms of initial debate. 
With this general framework in mind, I focus in Part II on conflicts 
between senators and presidents who have failed to adequately heed or 
account for a relatively robust institutional norm, long-standing practice, 
or expectation regarding judicial selection. These conflicts have followed 
two patterns. The first has involved presidents' attempts to re-shape 
11 For some prior discussions of this view, see GERHARDT, supra note 6. 
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some basic practices or procedures relating to judicial selection. Indeed, 
perhaps the most serious battle now occurring within the judicial 
appointments process is to develop a new norm or understanding 
regarding the requisite ideology for a judge. The second category of 
conflicts consists of presidents' failures to follow the governing norms in 
filling specific vacancies. The reasons for these failures have been varied, 
including over-confidence, negligence, competing priorities, and of 
course payback. 
Part III consists of models of accommodation. The first is capitulation 
or presidential abdication of authority, as epitomized by the Harding 
administration. The second model consists of an overview of the 
strategies employed by presidents and senators to achieve their 
respective objectives through negotiation or management of various 
institutional norms. This model also encompasses the practices relating 
to appointing judges in the midst of war. As illustrated by a review of 
several war-time presidents (including Abraham Lincoln, Franklin 
Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon), presidents have been 
able to achieve relatively conflict-free confirmation proceedings for 
judicial nominees in the midst of war when they, rather than the Senate, 
have been willing to bend or compromise in defining the terms for 
judicial selection. 
I. TERMSOFENGAGEMENT 
A few introductory clarifications are in order. First, my models reflect 
an important dynamic in the selection process. They are premised on the 
unusual power and opportunity that presidents have to set the terms of 
debate in a confirmation proceeding. Senators have more limited, 
though significant power to set or influence the agenda in a confirmation 
proceeding, because they are largely confined in the process to a 
defensive posture. In structural terms, this means that senators face the 
structural disadvantage of being in a defensive posture throughout the 
appointment process in which they are restricted to exercising a veto.12 
Senators have tried to compensate for their structural disadvantage 
through various means. One solution has been to develop various 
procedures and norms to facilitate the influence and input of individual 
senators and the Judiciary Committee leadership on judicial 
appointments. 
12 See generally John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the 
Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss & Sunstein, 71 TEx. L. REv. 633 (1993). 
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Second, the basic terms of war and norms need to be defined. I do not 
mean to rely on strict terms of art for either term. I sometimes loosely 
use the terms "battle" and "war," though I recognize the important 
differences between them. Indeed, it is useful to keep in mind that a 
contest over a particular judicial nomination is more like a battle than a 
war, for it is waged against a backdrop of larger contests among national 
political leaders. One important mechanism in these battles consists of 
institutional norms. Institutional norms refers to the informal 
understandings or arrangements among the leadership of national 
institutions developed over time, as well as the deviations from these 
arrangements which often trigger sanctions or disapproval.13 
Finally, it is very important to recognize the institutional norms 
applicable to the process of selecting lower court judges. The first and 
most robust of these is senatorial courtesy. Senatorial courtesy takes at 
least two forms in the appointments process.14 The first is the deference 
usually (but admittedly not always) given by senators to the nomination 
of a colleague to a federal judgeship. The Senate confirmed all six 
senators nominated to the Supreme Court in the 20th century- Edward 
Douglass White as Chief Justice, and as Associate Justices George 
Sutherland, Hugo Black, Jimmy Byrnes, Harold Burton, and Sherman 
Minton.15 While presidents have generally succeeded in nominating 
many former members of Congress (particularly from the House) to 
lower federal courts, 16 only two of these nominees were senators. In both 
cases - Franklin Roosevelt's nomination of Sherman Minton to the 
Seventh Circuit and Ronald Reagan's nomination of James Buckley to 
the District of Columbia Circuit- the Senate overwhelmingly confirmed 
the nominees. 17 
The second form of senatorial courtesy is the deference given by 
presidents to the choices of the senators from their parties for filling 
vacant federal judgeships in their respective states. I examine conflicts 
arising from breaches of this norm in more detail in the next part. 
13 See Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra note 10. 
" For a general discussion, see generally GERHARDT, supra note 6. 
'
5 Even people who have served in the House of Representatives seem to have had 
their nominations receive substantial deference from the Senate. In the twentieth century, 
the former House members successfully nominated to the Court include William Moody as 
Associate Justice and Fred Vinson as Chief Justice. See SUPREME COURT JuSTICES: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (Melvin J. Umfsky ed., 1994). 
16 See GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 129-30. 
17 See 87 CONG. REC. 54207 (1941) (confirming nomination of Sherman Minton to the 
Seventh Circuit); 131 CONG. REC. S17737 (1985) (confirming nomination of James Buckley 
to the District of Columbia Circuit). 
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Another institutional norm is presidents' and senators' recognition of 
the importance of nominating people from their parties to lower court 
judgeships. In the 19th century, party affiliation increasingly became a 
useful proxy and demonstration of a nominee's loyalty to a president's 
(or key senators') preferred constitutional ideology and policy views. 
Kermit Hall's excellent study of nineteenth-century lower court judicial 
appointments demonstrates the increasing importance of partisanship in 
judicial appointments.18 For instance, all of Grover Cleveland's lower 
court appointees were Democrats.19 The statistical break down of the 
party affiliations for modem presidents' appointees to lower courts 
reflects similar degrees of significance of partisanship in their selection, 
including the following: Franklin Roosevelt (98.5% for district judges 
and 96% for circuit judges); Harry Truman (93.8% for district judges and 
88.5% for circuit judges); Dwight Eisenhower (95.2 for district judges and 
93.3% for circuit judges); John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson (92.1% 
for district judges and 95.1% for circuit judges); Richard Nixon and 
Gerald Ford (89.6% for district judges and 93.0% for circuit judges); 
Jimmy Carter (90.6% for district judges and 82.1% for circuit judges); 
Ronald Reagan (91.7% for district judges and 96.2% for circuit judges); 
George H.W. Bush (88.5% for district judges and 89.2% for circuit 
judges); and Bill Clinton (87.5% for district judges and 85.2% for circuit 
judges).20 Moreover, Sheldon Goldman calculates striking statistics to 
demonstrate the extent or percentage of a president's judicial 
appointments based on a "partisan agenda" or made "to shore up 
political support for the president or for the party."21 According to 
Goldman, presidents from Truman through Clinton had percentages of 
circuit appointments made on the basis of facilitating their support 
within their respective parties ranging from a high of 100% for President 
Ford to a low of 25% for President Reagan, with every other president 
above 70%.22 
There are several other norms in federal judicial selection. These 
norms include good faith consultation with the Senate; nominating 
18 KERMIT L. HALL, THE POLffiCS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECDON AND 
THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-61 (Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1979). 
19 GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 129-30. 
20 See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECDON FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final 
Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282 (1993) [hereinafter Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy]; Sheldon 
Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Gary Zuk, Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the 
Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228 (2001) [hereinafter Clinton's Judges]. 
21 GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 3. 
22 See id. at 208. 
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people who satisfy the prevailing ethical and professional expectations 
of the times;23 responsible or credible rhetoric in characterizing 
nominees' credentials;24 timing; and basic procedures for vetting and 
processing judicial nominations (including ratings of the quality of 
judicial nominees by the American Bar Association).25 In the next two 
parts, I explore the significance of deviations from these norms. 
II. MODELS OF WAR 
This Part surveys two basic models of conflict in lower court judicial 
selection. In turn, I consider warrior presidents, who have invited 
conflict, and other presidents, who have ignored or discounted 
appointment norms at their own or their judicial nominees' peril. 
A. The Warrior Presidents 
In the classic The Art of War, Sun-Tzu makes two trenchant 
observations that one might imagine would resonate with most 
presidents in making Supreme Court nominations. The first is, "To win 
without fighting is best."26 The other is, "The side that knows when to 
fight and when not will take the victory. There are roadways not to be 
traveled, armies not to be attacked, walled cities not to be assaulted."27 
One has to wonder why any president would disregard either of these, 
but many seem to have done just that. So, one obvious question with 
which to begin an analysis of the models of conflict within judicial 
selection is why presidents sometimes welcome fights? That some do 
23 In his exhaustive study of federal judicial selection from Franklin Roosevelt through 
Reagan, Professor Goldman characterizes this norm as "the expectation that the president 
and his administration will ordinarily choose persons who have the education, experience, 
temperament, and reputation of legal acumen and integrity requisite for judicial office." Id. 
at 4 n.c. 
" 1his institutional norm is especially evident in Supreme Court selection. It is often 
the case that each side in a judicial confirmation contest attempts to demonize the other. 
The objective of the supporters of a nomination has been to demonize people who oppose 
the nomination, while the opponents of a nomination have tended to demonize the 
nominee. Interestingly, the efforts to demonize opposition tracks the rhetoric employed in 
times of war. A recent headline in the New York Times suggestively reads, "A Nation Defines 
Itself by its Evil Enemies." Robert F. Worth, A Nation Defines Itself by its Evil Enemies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at Dl. The article suggests that in a war national leaders tend to rally 
support by demonizing the enemy. Id. The same holds true in judicial confirmation 
proceedings. 
25 Shortly after taking office, President George W. Bush discontinued the policy. See 
infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
26 SUN-TZU, THE ART OF WAR at vii (Thomas Cleary trans., 1988). 
27 Id. at 125. 
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welcome contests is beyond any doubt. Some presidents - I call them 
the warrior presidents - have deliberately taken approaches that have 
provoked conflict with the Senate. The warrior presidents in American 
history seem to have had at least one important thing in common: they 
have invited heated conflicts over nominees for the sake of either 
fortifying their prerogatives or re-shaping the basic norms of the process. 
The most devastating defeats warrior presidents have had in the 
judicial selection process have involved their direct attacks to weaken or 
alter senatorial courtesy. At least three presidents, upon taking office, 
immediately set their sights on challenging senatorial courtesy in lower 
court judicial appointments. All three-Ulysses Grant, Herbert Hoover, 
and Jimmy Carter - paid enormous prices, particularly within their 
own parties, for their boldness. 
Grant's first Attorney General, Ebenezer Hoar, angered Republican 
senators by refusing to grant them carte blanche in their 
recommendations for federal judges in their respective states. Instead, 
he insisted on higher standards for judicial nominees, and many senators 
balked.28 This insistence eroded good will between many senators and 
the White House, and in the end it cost Grant and Hoar dearly when the 
Senate refused to confirm Hoar's nomination as an Associate Justice in 
retaliation for Hoar's conduct as Attorney General. 
Interestingly, Herbert Hoover tried a similar tactic almost immediately 
after taking office in 1928. Hoover wanted to end patronage 
appointments, particularly to the federal courts. Thus, at the outset of 
his administration he released a statement that he intended to end the 
practice of awarding judicial appointments based solely on patronage. 
Instead, he planned to raise the standards and requisite qualifications for 
judicial appointments.29 As Sheldon Goldman observes, "Herbert 
Hoover, with the aid of his attorney general, William Mitchell, attempted 
to break the grip that Republican senators had on lower court 
appointments in order to improve the quality of the appointees. This 
resulted in several battles with Republican senators and ultimately in an 
administration retreat."30 The retreat was only part of the bigger story, 
for the battles helped to erode Hoover's relations with his fellow 
Republicans in the Senate, so that over time he wielded increasingly less 
influence over dictating both domestic policy and Supreme Court 
28 See generally JOSEPH HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF 1HE SENATE: A STUDY OF 
1HE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY 1HE UNITED STATES SENATE (Univ. of California 
Press 1953). 
29 GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 146. 
"' GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 9. 
676 University of California, Davis [Vol. 36:667 
appointments. Before the end of his single term as president, he would 
find himself at the other extreme from which he started and acquiesce to 
the Senate's preferred candidate to replace Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.31 
In 1976, Jimmy Carter won the presidency based in part on his pledge 
to base high-level appointments on merit rather than patronage. 
Fulfilling his pledge required, inter alia, challenging senatorial courtesy 
for the sake of improving the quality and diversity of judicial 
appointments.32 He tried through legislation, executive orders, and 
negotiations to have merit-select commissions established that would 
recommend a slate of qualified persons for each judicial vacancy. Over 
time, serious friction developed between Carter and various senators 
within his own party over their willingness to follow his criteria in 
recommending candidates for various judgeships. Friction also existed 
within Carter's own administration over the priorities for and means to 
achieve administration objectives. It hardly helped that Carter's chief 
rival for leadership of his party, Ted Kennedy, chaired the Judiciary 
Committee. Ted Kennedy used his powers as Chairman to try to 
implement new norms for judicial selection, and in some instances, to 
thwart or embarrass Carter. While Carter succeeded in appointing 
unprecedented numbers of women and minorities as federal district and 
appellate judges,33 his success came at the enormous cost of fractured 
relations with senators from his own party. 
In two other instances, presidents have challenged basic procedures 
for appointing judges other than senatorial courtesy generally. The first 
involved President George H.W. Bush's frustration over Judiciary 
Committee access to FBI reports.34 Just as the Judiciary Committee was 
preparing to send Clarence Thomas' nomination as an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court to the full Senate for final consideration, the 
Judiciary Committee leaked Anita Hill's affidavit to the Justice 
Department. This leak led to an embarrassing turnaround by the 
Committee to re-open its hearings on Thomas. As part of the re-hearing, 
" See HARRIS, supra note 28. 
32 See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 236-84 (describing Carter's reform of 
judicial selection). 
" On diversifying judicial appointments, see generally Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender 
Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. C!N. L. REV. 1237 (1993); Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal 
Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309 (1996); Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on 
the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L. REV. 1861 (1994); Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial 
Selection, 1993 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1257 (1993). 
" See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 20, at 283-84. 
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the Committee called Hill and re-called Thomas in dramatic, televised 
appearances before the Committee to address her sexual harassment 
charges against him. Thouph the Senate ultimately confirmed Thomas 
by an extremely close vote,3 President Bush announced shortly after the 
final vote that he had issued an order restricting the Committee's future 
access to FBI reports. The order provoked an impasse that lasted for 
three months while the Committee refused to process any pending 
judicial nominations until it could arrange for its own investigation of 
the backgrounds of nominees to substitute for the FBI reports. After 
three months, the administration changed course by restoring access for 
Committee members and staff to FBI reports, but with a stricter 
accounting of who would be allowed to read the reports. The delay was 
fatal to over two dozen subsequent judicial nominees, because the 
nominees' earliest opportunities for hearings would not have been until 
1992 at which point the Senate slowed the process to a complete 
standstill pending the outcome of the presidential election. 
More recently, President Bush's son, George W. Bush, openly 
challenged a different procedure. Shortly after taking office, President 
George W. Bush's White House Counsel announced the administration's 
intentions to curtail the practice of the American Bar Association to pre-
screen possible judicial nominees.36 Ever since the ABA gave a mixed 
rating to Robert Bark in his confirmation hearings, many Republicans 
have questioned the organization's claim that its ratings are based on 
professional credentials and not on the ideology of judicial nominees. In 
1997, Senator Orrin Hatch, then the Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, concluded that these questions had sufficient merit to justify 
abandoning the ABA's privileged status in testifying about the quality of 
judicial nominees. In spite of this edict, President Clinton continued to 
consult informally with the ABA prior to making his judicial 
nominations. President Bush decided, however, to deny the ABA any 
privileged status in rating nominees. Democratic senators resented his 
decision. After regaining control of the Senate in May 2001, Democratic 
senators slowed down all pending judicial nominations to provide the 
ABA with the opportunity to rate the quality of the President's 
35 See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and 
Confirmation o!Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 969,970 (1992) [hereinafter Gerhardt, 
Divided Justice] (generally discussing the sequence of events culminating in Justice Thomas' 
confirmation proceedings). 
36 The ABA practice of screening possible judicial nominees began in 1946 and 
extended through the end of the Clinton administration. See Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra 
note 10, at 1712. 
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• 37 
nornmees. 
Beyond the challenges that Presidents George H.W. and George W. 
Bush have made to certain procedures in judicial selection, they joined 
President Reagan in an attempt to establish a new norm of judicial 
selection. Over the past two decades, one of the most common reasons 
for opposing judicial nominees has been doubt about or opposition to 
their likely judicial ideologies.38 The extremely low percentage of 
President Reagan's appellate court nominees made on the basis of 
partisan considerations reflects his administration's emphasis on 
ideology as an important, indispensable criterion for appointment.39 
With this emphasis, the Reagan administration introduced into the 
modem era an approach to judicial selection that effectively counted a 
candidate's likely ideology as the single, most important qualification for 
his or her appointment as a judge. Subsequent Republican 
administrations have tried to emphasize ideology to a similar degree in 
the nomination process. In addition, the vast majority of President 
Clinton's judicial nominees who experienced substantial or fatal delays 
in confirmation proceedings had their nominations opposed because of 
Republican senators' distrust of their likely ideologies.40 
Both the Senate Judiciary Committee's rejection of Judge Charles 
Pickering,41 and the slow pace of judicial confirmation proceedings,42 
reflect Democrats' dual concerns for payback and for opposing what 
they regard as extreme or outside-of-the-mainstream judicial ideologies. 
The ensuing focus of both sides on judicial nominees' likely ideologies 
reflects an important dynamic in judicial selection in which, in effect, 
Republicans and Democrats are vying to define or control the formation 
of a new norm of judicial selection. Rhetoric is an important weapon in 
this battle, as the contending sides have each tried to characterize the 
opposing sides' nominees in extremely unflattering terms. Each side 
casts its nominees as within the mainstream and many of the other side's 
nominees as well outside of it. In other words, Republicans and 
37 See STUDY OF CmzENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS (March 6, 2002) (indicating that 
judicial nominations have slowed down both to allow for ABA input on pending 
nominations and to address anti-terrorist legislation in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2001 attacks against the United States). 
38 See generally CmZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLillCS AND 
AMERICA'S COURTS (2000). This report has been recently updated. 
39 See id.; Goldman, supra note 20, at 3. 
"' See 145 CONG. REC. Sl1918 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1999) (providing vote on Ronnie White's 
nomination). 
41 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
" See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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Democrats are vying to define the standard that they each can use as a 
yardstick by which to measure the legitimate or appropriate ideologies 
for judicial appointments. In short, they are fighting to define the 
mainstream of constitutional law. 
The fight to define the mainstream coincides strikingly with 
unprecedented delays in the nomination and confirmation phases of the 
judicial selection process. A recent report of Citizens for Independent 
Courts indicates that the process for filling judicial vacancies is taking 
longer than ever. The time for filling them has increased from 38 days 
during the first two years of President Carter's term to 226 days during 
the last two years of President Clinton's administration. The study 
further indicates a steady decline in the percentage of a president's first-
year nominations confirmed by the Senate during that first year. The 
Senate confirmed 93% of President Reagan's first-year judicial 
nominations in 1981. In contrast, the Senate confirmed 44% of President 
George W. Bush's nominations in 2001. Additionally, the Senate took 
longer to confirm judges (an average of 112 days) in the first year of 
President George W. Bush's administration than it had taken during 
comparable periods of earlier administrations, with the exception of the 
first year of President Clinton's second term (an average of 133 days). 
The delays are due to various factors, including the change in Senate 
leadership in mid-2001 and the fact that the Democrats have been 
deferring Senate consideration of judicial nominations until they have 
been reviewed by the ABA.43 
In numerous other instances, presidents have not launched broad-
scale attacks on senatorial courtesy or challenged basic procedures. 
Instead, in the course of choosing particular nominees, presidents have 
breached various institutional norms. These breaches have given rise to 
the conflicts that I discuss in the next section. 
43 The study further indicates, as I have suggested, that President George W. Bush (to 
date) has taken a shorter amount of time to make nominations than his three predecessors. 
On average, he nominated a candidate within 165 days of a vacancy (or the date he took 
office), while the corresponding average for Clinton's first year was 253, for President 
George H.W. Bush 193, and for President Reagan 191. Of course, one major difference 
between President Bush and his three predecessors is that he is the only one not to have 
allowed the ABA to rate the quality of the nominees prior to their formally being 
nominated. The additional time required for the ABA to provide its ratings accounts in 
part for both the quicker pace with which President Bush makes nominations and the 
slower pace with which the Senate has been considering them. Id. 
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B. Mistakes in War 
The most common source of conflicts over judicial selection involves 
presidents' failure to follow institutional norms or long-standing 
expectations or practices. Presidents have failed to follow institutional 
norms for numerous reasons. However, more often than not, these 
failures can be traced to the specific circumstances in which presidents 
choose, for political or other reasons, to prioritize other short- or long-
term objectives. 
The first significant failure, which every president has made, is not to 
consult with the senator(s) from his party in the state for the judgeship(s) 
he is trying to fill. This failure is almost invariably fatal to the 
nomination's success, and perhaps most surprising, triggers sanctions 
not from senators from the opposition party but from the President's 
own party. 
These sanctions have been applied, regardless of the President's 
popularity. For instance, President Franklin Roosevelt was convinced 
that senatorial courtesy was an antiquated concept.44 Consequently, he 
sometimes ignored it to pursue other priorities, though in these instances 
with virtually no success. For instance, in 1938, he nominated Floyd 
Roberts, a New Deal supporter, to a federal district judgeship in 
Virginia.45 The state's governor, former governors, and one influential 
congressman supported both the New Deal and Roberts. Nevertheless, 
the state's two Democratic senators, who were philosophically opposed 
to the New Deal and thus to Roberts, effectively rallied other senators 
partly on the ground of preserving the prerogative of senatorial courtesy. 
Additionally, the two Virginia Senators helped spearhead the Senate 
Judiciary Committee's rejection of the nomination 15-3 as well as the full 
Senate's defeat of the nomination 72-9. 
Interestingly, Roosevelt's subsequent strategy for filling the judgeship 
paid homage to senatorial courtesy. Roosevelt offered the judgeship to 
Armistead Dobie, then the dean of the University of Virginia School of 
Law. Though Roosevelt had not consulted Virginia's Senators before 
offering the position to Dobie, he did consult with them and got their 
approval before formally forwarding the nomination to the Senate.46 
With the Senators on board, the nomination easily and quickly was 
confirmed by the full Senate. 
44 See GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 43. 
45 Id. at 42. 
46 Id. at 43-44. 
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In 1943, President Roosevelt made an even bolder attempt to bypass 
senatorial courtesy, which failed. He nominated James Allred to fill a 
federal district judgeship in Texas.47 Allred had the support of one Texas 
senator and other influential Democratic leaders in the state,48 but he had 
also run unsuccessfully to unseat the other Texas senator, W. Lee 
O'Daniel. Not surprisingly, O'Daniel vigorously opposed nominating 
his rival to fill the judgeship, and the Judiciary Committee split evenly 
on recommending the nomination for the full Senate to consider. Allred 
subsequently asked that his nomination be withdrawn. Nonetheless, 
President Truman successfully appointed him as a federal judge after 
O'Daniel had left the Senate. 
Although as a former senator, Harry Truman should have understood 
the importance of senatorial courtesy, he sometimes miscalculated and 
failed to take senatorial courtesy into account in making nominations. In 
one instance, he failed to consult with Georgia Senator Richard Russell 
before he nominated M. Neil Andrews to a federal district judgeship in 
Georgia.49 Truman had figured that he did not have to consult with 
Russell on this appointment because he had already given Russell his 
due by agreeing to another choice of Russell's for a different judicial 
vacancy in his state. The problem was that Russell preferred a different 
candidate, William Boyd Sloan, and thus vigorously opposed the 
Andrews nomination. He initially helped to stall its consideration, 
precipitating the President into giving Andrews a recess appointment 
(just as Roosevelt had done with Roberts). Nevertheless, both the 
Judiciary Committee and the full Senate voted to reject Andrews' 
nomination. While Truman was not pleased with the rejection, he 
reluctantly agreed to nominate Sloan to the judgeship, and the Senate 
quickly confirmed him. 
Another significant reason for frustrated or defeated judicial 
nominations is poor timing. As Sheldon Goldman explains, 
"Traditionally, minimal confirmation activity occurs during election 
years, especially when the Senate is controlled by one party and the 
White House by another."50 Statistics amply demonstrate the robustness 
of this basic norm: for instance, at the end of 2000 the Senate had not 
acted on 32 district and eight circuit court nominations made by 
President Clinton; in 1992 the Senate had not acted on 42 district and five 
47 Id. at 42. 
" Id. 
" See STUDY OF CmZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS at 71-72. 
50 See Goldman, Bush's judicial Legacy, supra note 20, at 284. 
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circuit court nominations made by the first President Bush. 51 
Timing can make a big difference in judicial selection in a different 
form - the pacing of the confirmation process. Over the years, senators 
have developed numerous parliamentary mechanisms to facilitate their 
input on judicial appointments. Some of these have included: 
individual senators' prerogative to place any judicial nominations 
temporarily on hold; filibusters; the Judiciary Committee Chair's implied 
authority to control the scheduling of hearings, numbers of witnesses, 
and timing of votes; and the majority leader's authority to control 
everything that comes to the floor of the Senate. 52 The instances in which 
senators have used one or more of the means to frustrate judicial 
nominations are numerous. As one might expect, senators employ these 
mechanisms for many reasons, including protecting senatorial courtesy, 
rewarding friends, payback, logrolling, and enforcing conceptions about 
the proper qualifications for judicial appointments. Five examples 
dramatically illustrate the significance of these mechanisms over time. 
First, in 1959 Lyndon Johnson became the first Senate Majority Leader 
ever to stall all pending judicial nominations until President Eisenhower 
agreed to nominate his preferred candidate for a judgeship in Johnson's 
home state.53 Johnson's strategy worked; the President nominated 
Johnson's friend Joe Fisher to the judgeship, the Senate confirmed Fisher 
three days later, and the log-jam was broken. 
Second, shortly after assuming the chairmanship of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 1979, Ted Kennedy introduced several 
innovations to judicial confirmation proceedings.54 He announced that 
senators who withheld the "blue slips" of persons nominated for 
judgeships from their states could no longer rely on the Chair to kill 
those nominations.55 Kennedy directed that every nomination would be 
discussed by the full Committee, and the Committee would determine 
whether to proceed with a nomination by holding a hearing.56 In 
addition, Kennedy arranged for the Committee to adopt a questionnaire 
that all nominees would be required to complete and that, with the 
51 See id. (stating that "[When the 102nd Congress adjourned in 1992], the Senate had 
not acted on 42 district and 10 appeals court nominations"); see also Clinton's Judges, supra 
note 20, at 234 (stating that "at the end of the 106th Congress, 40 [judicial] nominees 
languished in the Judiciary Committee ... "); id. at 246 (stating that "[a]t the end of the 106th 
Congress, 18 [appeals court] nominations had not been acted upon"). 
52 See generally GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 135-79. 
53 See id. at 138. 
" See GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 263. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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exception of a few questions, would be made available to the public.57 
The Committee also began to routinely publish its confirmation 
proceedings.58 Moreover, Kennedy invited various ~roups to testify 
before the Committee and to rate judicial nominees. 9 An especially 
important innovation was the establishment of the Committee's own 
investigatory staff to examine the backgrounds of judicial nominees 
apart from Justice Department inquiries.60 
Third, as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Orrin Hatch 
had placed all judicial nominations on hold through the first half of 1999. 
Part of . the reason why he did this was to wait for the outcome of 
President Clinton's impeachment trial in February 1999. He also wanted 
to pressure the President to nominate his preferred candidate- Ted 
Stewart- to a federal judgeship in his home state of Utah. Eventually, 
President Clinton and Senator Hatch choreographed an exchange.61 
President Clinton agreed to begin the vetting process for nominating 
Stewart, while Hatch agreed that as long as Stewart continued to 
progress through the appointments process, he would initiate hearings 
on some pending nominations. In October, the Senate confirmed 
Stewart, though most of the other pending nominations never reached 
the floor of the Senate for a final vote. 
Fourth, in March 2002, the Judiciary Committee rejected, by a strict 
party-line vote, President Bush's nomination of Charles Pickering to a 
seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.62 The vote 
infuriated Republicans, including President Bush and Pickering's 
sponsor, Minority Leader of the Senate, Trent Lott, both of whom had 
lobbied hard for the judge's confirmation. By another strictly partisan 
vote, the Committee majority also rejected the President's and Senator 
Lott's pleas to allow the nomination to be forwarded to the floor of the 
Senate for a full vote.63 Lott appealed in vain to the Senate Majority 
Leader Tom Daschle to intercede and forward the nomination to the 
Senate floor. Neither Daschle's and the Committee's refusals to forward 
the nomination were unusual. After all, as Majority Leader, Lott had 
consistently refused the same entreaties from Daschle when their roles 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See GoLDMAN, supra note 20, at 263 .. 
60 Id. 
61 See GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 141. 
62 See infra note 67. 
63 Id. 
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were reversed from 1994-2000.64 Additionally, the Judiciary Committee 
for decades had not forwarded to the floor a nomination that a majority 
had refused to endorse.65 Nevertheless, Republican senators, led by 
Trent Lott, retaliated immediately through a series of parliamentary 
maneuvers to impede other business in the Senate.66 Lott also exacted 
revenge against Daschle by announcing he would no longer support 
Daschle's preferred candidate for a Democratic slot on the Federal 
Communications Commission, thus impeding the candidate's 
nomination. 67 
Fifth, after regaining control of the Senate last year, Democrats have 
succeeded in slowing down the pace of judicial confirmation 
proceedings. By the end of 2001, the Senate had confirmed only 28 of 
President Bush's 80 judicial nominations.68 Moreover, of President 
Bush's first eleven circuit court nominations made in May of 2001, the 
Senate has not even held hearings on eight of them.69 As of this writing, 
twenty-two circuit nominations are pending before the Committee, and 
President Bush has yet to nominate people for nine other vacancies on 
the federal courts of appeals. 70 Michigan's two Democratic senators also 
" At least two significant events in the fall and winter of 2002 changed the dynamics 
of judicial selection for the foreseeable future. First, the Republicans retook control of the 
Senate as a result of gains made in the mid-term elections. Second, Lott resigned his 
position as Majority Leader in December as a consequence of arguably racist remarks he 
had made on the occasion of Strom Thurmond's retirement from the Senate. Lott's 
successor as Majority Leader, Bill Frist, promised, like Lott before him, to make the 
confirmation of the President's judicial nominees a priority in the 108th Congress. 
65 See Clinton's Judges, supra note 20, at 235. 
"' See James W. Brosnan, Federal Bench Nominees Left in Limbo: Bickering Curdles Senate 
into Inaction, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Mar. 23, 2002, at Al. 
67 See AI Kamen, Comma-Kaze, Lott and Daschle at War, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2002, at A21 
("A furious Lott vowed to retaliate [for failed nomination of Pickering] and blocked the 
appointment of Jonathon S. Adelstein, Daschle's top communications aide, to a Democratic 
vacancy on the Federal Communications Commission."); Michael Petrocelli, Pickering 
Fallout Persists; GOP Shuts Down Committees in Retaliation for Snub, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 21, 
2002, at A6; Ana Radelat, Lott Facing Toughest Time Since Losing Control of Senate, GANNETT 
NEWSSERV., Mar. 22,2002. 
68 David G. Savage, The World & Nation; Bush's Judicial Nominees Go 28 for SO in the 
Senate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at Al. 
69 The nominations in which the Senate had not acted by May 2001 include legal 
scholar Michael McConnell nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
John Roberts nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (almost a 
decade after the Senate had failed to act on his nomination to the same court by President 
George H.W. Bush), and Carolyn Kuhl nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. For the current status of federal court nominees before the Judiciary 
Committee, see United States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nominations to U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, available at http:/ /www.senate.gov I -judiciary /nominations_appeals.cfm. 
70 See Brosnan, supra note 66. 
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have put holds on all three of the President's nominees to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals in retaliation against the Republicans' fatal blocks of two 
Democratic nominees to the same court.71 Senator Patrick Leahy of 
Vermont, the outgoing Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee,72 has 
explained that the delays are due to some extent to the need to handle 
other priorities including anti-terrorist legislation. On the other hand, 
Republicans charge that the delays are attributable primarily to the 
preferences of Committee Democrats for liberal activist judges and 
hostility to qualified conservative judicial nominees. In all likelihood, 
the delays are payback for the Republicans' unprecedented delays of 
President Clinton's judicial nominations/3 including 41 at the end of his 
administration.74 
As these and many other examples amply illustrate, senators' 
opposition or resistance to judicial nominees is attributable to many 
different reasons, including but not limited to doubts about the 
nominees' qualifications. To be sure, there has never been any consensus 
in the Senate on the minimal qualifications for federal judges. Nor has 
there been any meaningful agreement in recent years on whether there is 
some objective measure or arbiter of judicial qualifications, with one 
major exception. The exception is that senators over the years have 
insisted that judicial nominees have, inter alia, the requisite integrity to 
serve as federal judges. Hence, nominees' ethical lapses are a frequently 
cited basis for rejecting or opposing many judicial nominations.75 
Other common questions that have arisen about nominees' 
qualifications have to do with their trial practice (particularly for district 
judges), temperament, participation in activities unsuitable for judges 
(such as membership in discriminatory clubs), and judicial philosophy. 
Three dramatic illustrations of these concerns in practice are: {1) the 
Senate Judiciary Committee's close vote on former Connecticut 
Governor Thomas Meskill/6 (2) the forced withdrawal of President 
Reagan's nomination of former Louisiana Governor David Treen to the 
" Id. 
72 As a consequence of the mid-term elections of 2002, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch 
became the Chair of the Judiciary Committee in January 2003._ 
73 See generally GERHARDT, supra note 6. 
" See Savage, supra note 68, at Al (quoting Professor Sheldon Goldman). 
75 For many examples of rejections based on ethical concerns, see Clinton's Judges, supra 
note 20, at 236-37. 
76 President Nixon initially nominated Governor Meskill. President Ford re-
nominated Meskill to the Second Circuit in spite of the ABA's rating of him as "not 
qualified." This led the Ford administration to avoid thereafter nominating other people 
rated by the ABA as "not qualified." 
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Fifth Circuit based on his past participation in the segregationist 
Louisiana States' Rights Party, and (3) the Judiciary Committee's 
negative vote on President Reagan's nomination of Jeff Sessions to a 
federal district judgeship in Alabama and split vote on forwarding it to 
the Senate floor (effectively killing it) based on several racially 
insensitive statements made by Sessions. 
III. ACHIEVING PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE 
For presidents and senators to achieve peaceful co-existence in the 
appointment process is not easy, particularly in times of divided 
government. Even when the same party controls both the White House 
and the Senate, peaceful co-existence is hard to achieve. Woodrow 
Wilson and Bill Clinton both endured in the first years of their respective 
presidencies tense relations with their fellow Democrats for the same 
basic reason. Each became the first Democratic president after relatively 
long periods in which the other party had occupied the White House-
sixteen for Wilson and twelve for Clinton. Thus, from the outset of these 
presidencies, many Democratic senators felt they were long overdue in 
having their preferred candidates fill the vacant judgeships in their 
respective states.77 Clinton's difficulties clearly extended to the selection 
of Supreme Court justices. Even though Democrats controlled the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and the Senate, he did not want to expend precious 
political capital in defending his nominees in protracted confirmation 
proceedings. Instead, he preferred to expend these resources on 
legislative priorities.78 
More generally, presidents have pursued at least three strategies to 
deal with the difficulties in achieving peaceful co-existence in judicial 
selection. More generally, the first is simply to abdicate presidential 
authority in choosing nominees and defer almost completely to senators' 
preferences. Such deference was relatively common throughout the 
nineteenth century, particularly when the same party controlled the 
White House and the Senate and judicial nominations were made on the 
basis of party affiliation and activity.79 
77 See GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 98-99. 
78 See DAVID A. YALOF, PuRSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLffiCS AND THE 
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 196-207 (1999). 
79 Kermit Hall comprehensively examines the patterns of judicial appointments in the 
19th century. He notes, for example, that Martin Van Buren's judicial appointments were 
"more party directed than [those made] during Jackson's administrations." Hall, supra 
note 18. Van Buren made 17lower court nominations; and, unlike Jackson's, Van Buren's 
nominees, with only one exception, met no opposition in the Senate. Id. Similarly, in 
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In the twentieth century, the President who came closest to complete 
abdication was Warren G. Harding.80 Indeed, the Republican party 
establishment backed Harding as President in part because it believed he 
would cede to its preferences for lower court judicial nominees and other 
important appointments. This is an inference from the fact that 
Republicans backed Harding in part because they believed they would 
have more authority with him as President. As President, Harding made 
clear from the outset his desire to return to "normalcy," which in the 
area of judicial selection meant granting to the senators from his party 
their preferred choices to fill the judgeships in their respective states. 
A second strategy is to accept, perhaps even to invite, some conflict 
over judicial appointments to demonstrate the President's strength and 
to define the President and his enemies through such conflicts. Perhaps 
the most dramatic example of a nineteenth-century president who 
followed this strategy was Andrew Jackson. In the twentieth century, 
William Howard Taft81 and, to a lesser extent, Ronald Reagan82 and 
George W. Bush willingly fought with the Senate over some 
• 83 
appomtments. 
A third strategy entails negotiating and otherwise coordinating or 
managing the governing norms of judicial selection to achieve or 
maintain relatively peaceful co-existence.84 Negotiations between 
presidents and senators have produced many different arrangements. 
Some of these arrangements have included: the creation of new 
making ten lower court judicial appointments as president, Zachary Taylor "wielded ... 
judicial patronage in an outwardly party-directed fashion." Id. The same was true later in 
the century for Republican presidents Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur; and Grover Cleveland 
based all thirty-four of his lower court appointments on party considerations. Id. 
"' HARRIS, supra note 28, at 116. 
81 See id. at 166-67; GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 100-01. 
82 See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 286-96. 
83 See Ari Fleischer, White House Press Briefing, reprinted in FDCH POLffiCAL 
TRANSCRIPTS, Mar. 14,2002 (stating that "the greatest consequence of this Senate committee 
killing this nomination if they do so will be injustice in America on delays in the court on 
the number of vacancies in the court ... what's so distressing about the process the Senate 
leadership has chosen to take [with respect to Judge Pickering is that it is] a partisan one, 
that defies bipartisanship ... "); Joseph Curl, Bush Links Vote on Pickering to Constitution, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2002, at A10 (reporting that "[Bush says] today's Senate Judiciary 
Committee vote on the nomination of Uudge Pickering] will illustrate whether Congress 
has a deep respect for the Constitution and for the president's right and responsibility to 
nominate qualified judges"}; Bill Sammon, Bush Marshals Backers for Pickering, WASH. DMES, 
Mar. 7, 2002, at A3 (reporting that "[Bush calls] Pickering a fine jurist, a man of quality and 
integrity [and warned] against a Senate process that would malign a man such as him"). 
84 See generally GERHARDT, supra note 6. 
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judgeships over which presidents have greater latitude to fill;85 
appointing people from under-represented groups without taking 
opportunities away from established constituencies; senators' providing 
lists of names of acceptable candidates chosen pursuant to criteria set 
forth by an adrninistrationr states with senators from both parties 
alternating in making recommendations to the President;87 and making a 
trade in which a senator gets his or her preference for a judicial 
appointment on a court in exchange for the President's getting his 
preferred candidate appointed to the same (or some other) court.88 
Some negotiations between presidents and senators are more visible 
than others, and the degree or extent of visibility is a factor in their 
success. For instance, President Dwight Eisenhower, who generally 
preferred to operate through a hidden hand,89 set the guiding principles 
for judicial selection and charged the Justice Department with the 
responsibility for implementing them. His staff largely insulated him 
from the political pressures of the process. In practice, this meant that 
the Justice Department became "the locus of dealing with members of 
Congress,"90 and neither Eisenhower nor his Justice Department ever 
directly challenged the Senate. Hence, the Senate did not reject any of 
85 See Clinton's Judges, supra note 20, at 243-52. President Carter used this strategy to 
appoint people from under-represented groups without taking opportunities away from 
established constituencies. See, e.g., id. at 250. 
86 President Regan cut a deal with the Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and the 
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee Strom Thurmond "to give the administration 
more flexibility in naming district judges while retaining senatorial influence." GOLDMAN, 
supra note 20, at 287-88. The plan was for Republican senators to provide the President 
with a list of three to five names for each judicial vacancy to be filled in their respective 
states. The recommendations were to be made pursuant to criteria set forth by the 
administration. While the plan was successfully implemented early in Regan's presidency, 
it eventually fell apart. Id. at 288-90. Some Republican senators chafed from the outset at 
having to meet any selection criteria and went back to recommending to the President only 
a single name for each vacancy in their states, while the slate of people recommended by 
other senators became meaningless because they simply signaled their preferences through 
other channels. Id. 
87 Variations of this practice were used by New York's senators from the 1970s through 
the 1990s, as well as by Washington's two senators from 1997 until the end of the Clinton 
administration. See Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in the 
Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 299 (1999); Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra note 
10, at 1710 n. 82. 
88 This arrangement was employed, for instance, by President Clinton and 
Washington's Senator Slade Gorton to fill two pending vacancies on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 140. 
89 See FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN HAND PRESIDENCY: EISENHOWER As LEADER 
57-59 (Basic Books 1982). 
90 GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 131. 
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his nominees. To be sure, there were conflicts, and Eisenhower could be 
embarrassed or coerced into accepting a senator's preference as he did 
with Lyndon Johnson in 1959. Yet, senators from both parties quickly 
came to realize and accept that most trading occurred below radar and 
thus without public awareness or scrutiny. 
In contrast, Bill Clinton's negotiations with senators often became 
public, and the more public they became the more it became a liability 
for Clinton and his nominees.91 Clinton's initial strategy was to avoid 
any public fights over judicial nominees. He reasoned that the fewer 
high profile contests the less likelihood of campaigns being waged for 
and against nominees for the sake of scoring political points.92 In other 
words, lowering the visibility of the judicial selection process would help 
to de-politicize the judicial selection process, because it would increase 
the likelihood of a more professional, less politically explosive 
negotiation over the merits of particular appointments. Indeed, Clinton 
and his advisers invested less in nominating particular people than in 
nominating particular kinds of nominees. Their objective, which they 
believe they largely achieved, was to improve the quality and diversity 
of judicial appointments. They viewed many prospective candidates as 
fungible, allowing them to gravitate away from the candidates likely to 
promise trouble and towards those that seemed to hold greater promise 
of relatively easy confirmation. 
Clinton's strategy and its implementation came at a price, besides its 
culminating in only one judicial nominee - Ronnie White - being 
formally rejected by the Senate.93 First, the strategy contained the seeds 
of its own undoing. Clinton's hope to avoid high-profile contests over 
judicial appointments merely signaled to opposition senators that they 
were likely to prevail in any contest so long as they signaled their 
willingness to wage a highly visible campaign against a nominee. Once 
Clinton backed down early in his presidency when faced with such 
threats, he signaled the effectiveness of making the threat to wage a 
protracted, visible contest over a judicial appointment. Thus, senators 
recognized that the greatest leverage they had in negotiating with 
91 See generally GERHARDT, supra note 6. 
92 See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to 
Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 256-57 (1997); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's 
Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 80 JUDICATURE 264, 284 (1999): Sheldon 
Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 290-
91 (1995). 
93 See Clinton's Judges, supra note 20, at 232. For the story of the confirmation contest 
over White's nomination, see id. at 232, 239-41. 
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Clinton over prospective nominees was threatening to make a public 
contest and thus forcing the President to decide whether or not he 
wanted to expend his political capital in such a fight. 
Second, the bargaining phase of Clinton's judicial selection entailed an 
entirely new approach in the pre-nomination phase of judicial selection. 
Clinton and others began to see a perverse advantage to publicizing the 
pre-nomination phase of the process. While this practice helped the 
administration to settle on relatively strong nominees for many 
judgeships, it subjected many people to public evisceration. Indeed, the 
floating of possible candidates for judgeships became a substitute for the 
confirmation process because the administration would often make 
choices of nominees based on the extent to which they could survive 
such public vetting. Senators and interest groups figured they could 
influence the choices of possible nominees by quickly and publicly 
condemning or promoting certain nominees. In time, a relatively 
unseemly process evolved in which negotiations over nominees no 
longer occurred behind closed doors, as it had during the Eisenhower 
administration, but rather in newspapers and other public fora. 94 
Third, Clinton's bargaining was further complicated by his 
impeachment and other legislative priorities. Clinton needed to bargain 
in order to maintain or cultivate political support for other important 
initiatives, including his own survival in office. As a practical matter, 
this meant that he was often bargaining from a position of weakness. 
Thus, once made, his nominees could not rely solely on him for their 
success and thus languished when he had to expend his political coinage 
on other matters. As Sheldon Goldman reports, Republican staffers 
acknowledged that one important reason many of Clinton's judicial 
nominees languished in his final year in office is that no one- not even 
Clinton - seemed willing to expend any efforts to get them hearings 
much less floor votes.95 
Interestingly, one tactic that helped Clinton and other presidents in the 
past (but notably not President George W. Bush in fighting for Pickering) 
was to take the initiative in making and fighting on behalf of a high-
profile nomination. This tactic is extremely important for avoiding 
submission like that of President Harding. Moreover, this tactic has been 
used effectively by some presidents to clarify early on what they want 
and the preferences over which they will fight. Even though President 
Reagan clearly set the appointment of conservatives to the lower courts 
94 See YALOF, supra note 78, at 196-207. 
95 See Clinton's Judges, supra note 20, at 230-31, 238. 
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as a major priority of his administration, he picked his fights carefully.96 
In spite of the extraordinary extent to which Reagan based his 
nominations on ideological rather than partisan concerns, Sheldon 
Goldman notes, "[a] characteristic of judicial selection during Reagan's 
first term was the apparent reluctance to engage in a confirmation fight 
in the Senate even if it meant sacrificing a philosophically desirable 
candidate ... "97 Moreover, President Reagan was careful not to 
nominate people to the courts of appeals unless he (or his team) was 
satisfied "that the nominee shared the administration's judicial 
philosophy. When a potential nominee had strong political backing but 
doubts were raised about the candidate's philosophical reliability, the 
burden was on the candidate's backers to demonstrate that the doubts 
were unfounded."98 This approach reflected respect for senatorial 
courtesy and negotiating while preserving and underscoring President 
Reagan's basic commitment to making judicial appointments a high-
profile priority of his administration. President Reagan's willingness to 
use his popularity to fight for his nominees provided formidable 
leverage on their behalf, though it coincided significantly with his 
party's control of the Senate. 
Both Presidents Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt were at least as 
equally interested in their judicial nominees' philosophy as President 
Reagan, but they often engaged in deals to consolidate party support and 
to promote their domestic agendas, particularly during times of war.99 
% Of course, there were some high-profile contests over some judicial nominations. 
See GoLDMAN, supra note 20. The administration was apparently willing to fight over some 
but not other nominees because of the strength of the nominees' likely political backing or 
because it was trying to effectuate or implement a deal or trade. Id. 
97 Id. at 299-300. 
•• Id. at 305. 
99 Lincoln's deference was not, however, automatic or extreme; it was usually based on 
each side getting something out of the appointment. Lincoln's Supreme Court 
appointments would prove to be different only in degree not in kind from the other 
appointments he made as president. Consequently, he generally deferred to congressional 
leaders on the candidates for filling vacancies with the primary condition that they met 
criteria set forth for their selection by the President. In all six appointments he made to the 
Court, Lincoln faced no serious conflict with senators but instead was able to find 
nominees agreeable to Republican leaders each time. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt is a second example of a president adept at employing 
institutional norms to get his way. When he finally got an opportunity to fill a vacancy on 
the Court, it did not happen until the beginning of his second term. When the vacancy 
finally arose in 1937, it proved to be a pivotal one, for the retiring justice was one of the 
most ardent opponents to constitutional foundations of the New Deal - Willis Van 
DeVanter. There was no question there would be a fight, because the appointment, if 
confirmed, would produce for the first time in the Court's history a critical mass of justices 
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Lincoln was notorious at employing patronage to secure support for 
party unity as well as his domestic agenda. 100 This is especially evident 
with his six Supreme Court appointments, all of which were made with 
significant input by party and Senate leaders.101 Similarly, Franklin 
Roosevelt was acutely sensitive to prospective nominees' political 
backing throughout his presidency, particularly during World War II. 
As Sheldon Goldman further observes, "When the political backing was 
exceptionally strong and there were questions raised as to the 
candidate's fidelity to the New Deal, the benefit of the doubt was often 
given to the candidate."102 Roosevelt's willingness to compromise 
stemmed from his recognition of the long-term benefits of agreeing to a 
particular senator's choices. Thus, he would often consider the impact 
his choice of a nominee would have on a senator's support for his 
administration.103 
As the Lincoln and Roosevelt examples illustrate, a great deal depends 
on the popularity of the war during which judicial selection takes place. 
Only a few presidents have made Supreme Court nominations in times 
of war, and only Lincoln and Roosevelt were fighting for a cause popular 
with most senators. The point at which Roosevelt's approach to 
Supreme Court selection most closely resembled Lincoln's was the 1940s, 
the period in which the nation formally entered the Second World War. 
In these years, Roosevelt's nominees were Jimmy Byrnes in June 1941, 
Harlan Fiske Stone as Chief Justice in June 1941 (the day on which the 
Senate confirmed Byrnes), and Wiley Rutledge in February 1943. Byrnes 
was a former senator and thus able to take advantage of senatorial 
courtesy. Stone was a Republican whose nomination bespoke of 
bipartisanship and a desire on the part of the President to put aside party 
differences as best he could under the circumstances. Rutledge was a 
relatively inoffensive nominee whom most senators did not know or 
who opposed economic due process and supported greater judicial deference to 
congressional exercises of its Commerce Clause power. Roosevelt was not interested in a 
compromise. His nomination proved to be surprising not because he turned to a senator or 
an ardent supporter of the New Deal but rather he turned to someone who, as a senator, 
had not been known as a great constitutional thinker (like Sutherland) but as an ardent 
partisan. The views of his nominee, Hugo Black, were well known to his colleagues in the 
Senate, but the powerful norm of senatorial deference to the nomination of a colleague to 
the Court worked in Black's favor and led many senators who might have opposed him 
otherwise to accept his nomination begrudgingly. 
100 See DAVID HERBERT DoNALD, LINCOLN RECONSIDERED: ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR 
ERA 173-74 (3d ed. 2001). 
101 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as War, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 393 (2002). 
102 GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 33. 
103 GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 41. 
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take the time to know. 
Other Presidents, who have made judicial nominations in times of 
war, have not had their judicial nominees receive special deference 
because their nominations coincided with an ongoing military conflict. It 
is possible one reason that none received special deference is that neither 
the Korean nor Vietnam conflict was popular (especially over time) with 
the American people. Another plausible reason they received no special 
deference is that senators drew a distinction between domestic and 
foreign policy and thus their support for the latter did not have any 
effect on their support for the former. 
CONCLUSION 
I have tried to suggest war is not inevitable in judicial selection. It can 
be avoided if political leaders choose to follow the norms they have 
developed over the years for guiding the process. War breaks out when 
national political leaders, particularly presidents, breach these norms. 
Since war is, in Clausewitz' famous judgment, an extension of politics, 
one is left to wonder about the politics or motives driving combat over 
judicial appointments. In considering the reasons for combat, I cannot 
help but recall a question raised by Winston Churchill in the midst of 
World War II. When asked whether the East End of London should be 
shut down and theater productions stopped because of the bombing of 
the city, Churchill responded, "No. What the hell do you think we are 
fighting for?" As combats erupt over judicial appointments, it is useful 
to ask, in a similar vein, "What the hell are each of the sides fighting for, 
and what do these contests tell us about them and, more importantly, 
us?" 
*** 
